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In one sense, it was not surprising that the Bush Administration 
showed such disdain for protecting voting rights. After all, President 
Bush was elected due to a series of voting rights failures.1 Everyone 
knows about the butterfly ballots in Palm Beach2 and the abortive 
recount.3 But another, less visible problem dwarfed the effects of the 
butterfly ballot, or the snafus at various polling places, or the 
undercount attributable to pregnant chads that never gave birth and 
dimpled chads that never smiled. A staggering number of individuals 
were denied the chance to participate as a result of Florida’s lifetime 
disenfranchisement of people convicted of a felony.4 At the time of 
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 1. See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, 
WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 
2000 (rev. ed. 2001) (discussing the variety of problems that occurred with respect to tallying the 
vote in Florida); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA 
DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001) (hereinafter VOTING IRREGULARITIES), 
available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/main.htm (detailing problems with, 
among other things, voting rolls, polling place accessibility, voter challenges, pollworker 
training, voting machines, and vote tabulation). 
 2. See id. at 157–58 (describing the problems with the ballot format in Palm Beach County 
that resulted in an estimated two-thousand voters who had intended to vote for Al Gore to 
instead have their votes recorded for Pat Buchanan). 
 3. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 4. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person convicted of a 
felony . . . shall be qualified to vote or hold office until restoration of civil rights.” Until reforms 
enacted in 2008, see Exec. Order No. 08-179 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at 
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Bush v. Gore, Florida disenfranchised more than 600,000 individuals 
who had finished serving their sentences, including roughly ten 
percent of the state’s African-American population.5 The official 
margin of victory for George Bush in Florida was 537 votes.6 
Sociologists Chris Uggen and Jeff Manza have estimated that if ex-
offenders who had completed serving their sentences in Florida had 
been allowed to vote, and had voted only at the same rate as other 
people of the same socioeconomic background, age and the like, Al 
Gore would have carried Florida by more than 31,000 votes.7 Voting 
rights do make a difference. 
The Florida debacle went far beyond disenfranchising hundreds of 
thousands of citizens for antiquated reasons. Florida did more than 
just exclude hundreds of thousands of ex-offenders from the polls; it 
also struck from the rolls large numbers of people who had never 
been convicted of a disqualifying crime but whose names matched the 
names of ex-offenders. Thousands of unquestionably eligible voters 
who showed up to cast ballots were denied the right to participate. In 
Hillsborough County, the supervisor of elections estimated that 
fifteen percent of the people purged from the voter lists were in fact 
eligible to vote and that a majority of the voters purged were black.8 
After the election—when of course it was too late to cure the 
problem that had already occurred—more than 4,800 Floridians 
pursued an administrative appeals process and over half were 
restored to the rolls from which they should never have been purged 
in the first place.9 In light of the voting-related failures that propelled 
him into office, it seems fitting that, when it came to voting rights, the 
 
http://www.flgov.com/pdfs/orders/08-179-extension.pdf (State of Florida, Office of the 
Governor), it was exceptionally difficult for citizens in Florida who had been convicted of a 
felony to obtain restoration of their civil rights. 
 5. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate 
Over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1157 (2004) (citing One Person, No 
Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2002), and  
Johnson v. Bush, 353 F.3d 1287, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003)). 
 6. David Leip, 2000 Presidential General Election Results—Florida, 
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?year=2000&fips=12&f=0&off=0&elect=0 (last 
visited May 20, 2009). 
 7. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? The Political Consequences 
of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 793 tbl.4a (2002). 
 8. VOTING IRREGULARITIES, supra note 1, ch. 5, at text accompanying note 207. 
 9. See John O. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a 
Multiracing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1252, 1275 (2001) (discussing the election results and 
responses to the results in Florida). 
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Bush Administration was the most disappointing administration, by 
far, in American history. 
The lessons we can learn from what went wrong during the Bush 
years are both substantive and procedural. On the substantive front, 
we saw the specter of fraud, rather than the risk of exclusion, come to 
dominate the debate over democratic integrity. We need to reframe 
that debate. On the procedural front, we saw an administration 
transform the Department of Justice, and particularly the Civil Rights 
Division’s Voting Section, from a nonpartisan protector of voting 
rights into a political actor. We need to remake that Department. 
I.  SUBSTANTIVE LESSONS LEARNED: HOW THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION TREATED VOTE FRAUD AS A BIGGER PROBLEM 
THAN POLITICAL EXCLUSION 
The decision to elevate voter fraud above voter exclusion as the 
primary threat to American elections colored the first major voting-
related statute passed during the Bush Administration, the so-called 
Help America Vote Act (HAVA).10 The initial motivation for federal 
legislation lay in the problems of the 2000 election, particularly the 
failures to permit eligible citizens to cast ballots and have those 
ballots counted, but in the end HAVA did little to safeguard the right 
to vote and a lot to sow confusion along the way. It replaced one set of 
problems with another. 
HAVA’s regulation of voter registration illustrates how the new 
law created its own set of problems. In the wake of studies that 
showed that more votes had been lost through flaws in voter 
registration than through the more notorious malfunctioning 
machines,11 HAVA required states to create statewide, computerized 
 
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2000 & Supp. V. 2005). I say “so-called” because I think the 
Help America Vote Act has about as much to do with helping Americans to vote as the USA 
PATRIOT Act has to do with protecting patriotic Americans. 
 11. A report published by the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project estimated that 
between four million and six million votes had been “lost” during the 2000 election, of which  
1.5 million to three million were due to registration-related problems. See VOTING: WHAT IS, 
WHAT COULD BE 8–9 (2001), available at http://vote.caltech.edu/drupal/files/report/ 
voting_what_is_what_could_be.pdf (discussing the reasons why votes were lost and the 
estimated number of votes lost for each reason). 
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voter registration lists.12 But the goal of making it “easier to vote” was 
consistently paired with a desire to make it “harder to cheat.”13 Thus, 
HAVA required that the states maintain the accuracy of these new 
voter registration lists by, among other things, “matching” the 
information from registration forms and the subsequently generated 
HAVA-mandated list against information in other government 
databases—for example, drivers’ license records.14 Inaccuracies, 
glitches in data entry, and the like, however, can result in matching 
failures that prompt states to improperly remove eligible citizens 
from the rolls.15 And while HAVA provided a gesture in the direction 
of a failsafe by requiring states to allow aspiring voters whose names 
were not on the rolls to cast “provisional ballots,”16 federal law 
actually set no rules as to when such ballots must be counted. Not 
surprisingly, different states have taken significantly different 
positions on whether to count them.17 
More importantly, HAVA set the tone for a period in which 
officials hostile to voting rights, particularly the voting rights of 
traditionally disenfranchised groups, were able to frame the entire 
issue as raising a tradeoff between enfranchisement and fraud. 
A. Voter Identification Laws 
The arena where this played out most fully involves voter 
identification laws.18 These laws require voters to present specified 
forms of identification—in the case of Indiana’s law, for example, 
 
 12. See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a) (2000 & Supp. V. 2005) (“[E]ach state . . . shall implement, in 
a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive 
computerized statewide voter registration list . . . .”). 
 13. Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform, 17 WM. & MARY  
BILL RTS. J. 453, 470 (2008) (citing David Nather, Election Overhaul May Have to Wait in Line 
Behind Other ‘Crisis’ Issues, CQ WKLY., July 27, 2002, at 2034 (quoting Rep. Steny Hoyer)). 
 14. See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. V. 2005) (requiring, in most cases, a 
driver’s license number to register a voter). 
 15. See generally JUSTIN LEAVITT, WENDY R. WEISER & ANA MUÑOZ, MAKING THE LIST: 
DATABASE MATCHING AND VERIFICATION PROCESSES FOR VOTER REGISTRATION 7–22 
(2006), available at https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/8767/27Making the 
List- Database Matching Verification Processes for Voter Registration.pdf?sequence=1 
(discussing the requirements put in place by HAVA). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 15482(b)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V. 2005). 
 17. See Gerald M. Feige, Comment, Refining the Vote: Suggested Amendments to the Help 
America Vote Act’s Provisional Balloting Standards, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 449, 453 (2005) 
(noting the differences in state law regarding provisional ballots). 
 18. For a general discussion of these laws, see Spencer Overton, Voter Identification,  
105 MICH. L. REV. 631 (2007). 
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voters were required to present a government-issued, currently valid 
photo ID19—in order to cast their ballot and have it counted. Voter 
identification laws were passed ostensibly to deal with the problem of 
vote fraud by impersonation at the polls.20 There is, however, no 
evidence whatsoever of significant amounts of such impersonation: in 
Indiana, for example, there is not one verified incident of vote fraud 
by impersonation in the state’s entire history.21 By contrast, there is 
uncontested evidence that millions of citizens lack the documents 
necessary to satisfy the most restrictive voter ID requirements.22 
The Bush Administration went out of its way to abet these new, 
and unnecessary, barriers to voting. It filed an amicus brief at the 
Supreme Court in the Indiana voter ID case backing the state’s 
position. The Administration’s brief asserted as “fact” an unsupported 
hypothesis advanced in an earlier Supreme Court decision that 
“‘[v]oter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process 
and breeds distrust of our government.’”23 That hypothesis was 
fundamentally undercut by later research suggesting that fears of 
fraud “do not have any relationship to a [citizen’s] likelihood of 
intending to vote or turning out to vote.”24 And the Administration’s 
brief implicitly elevated the interests of ID-possessing voters over 
their less well-documented compatriots by insisting that “‘voting 
fraud impairs the right of legitimate voters to vote by diluting their 
votes—dilution being recognized to be an impairment of the right to 
vote.’”25 At the same time, the brief dismissively downplayed the 
 
 19. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1613 (2008) (Stevens, J.). 
 20. See id. at 1617, 1619–20. 
 21. Id. at 1619. For a more extensive discussion of the evidence of fraud—more accurately, 
the lack thereof—see Overton, supra note 18, at 644–50; David Schultz, Less Than 
Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of the Second Great 
Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 494–501 (2008). 
 22. See Overton, supra note 18, at 658–61 (providing various data suggesting that between 
six and ten percent of all citizens of voting age lack such documentation, with much higher rates 
among the youngest and oldest Americans of voting age, among persons with disabilities, and in 
urban minority communities). 
 23. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18, Crawford, 
128 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 07-21) (quoting Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006)), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2007/3mer/1ami/2007-0021.mer.ami.pdf [hereinafter Crawford 
Amicus Brief]. 
 24. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The 
Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements,  
121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1739 (2008). 
 25. Crawford Amicus Brief, supra note 23, at 28 (quoting the court of appeals opinion, 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
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barriers faced by voters who lacked such identification. Left out of the 
Administration’s analysis entirely was any mention of the fact that the 
Indiana law, like all the recently-enacted restrictions, was passed along 
a strict party-line vote, with only Republicans supporting the 
measure.26 
B. Voter ID Laws and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
The Administration behaved similarly when it carried out its 
responsibilities under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to 
review several states’ voter identification laws.27 Section 5 requires 
specified jurisdictions that have had a history of disenfranchisement 
to satisfy federal authorities that any proposed changes in their 
election laws have neither a racially discriminatory purpose nor a 
racially discriminatory effect before implementing those changes.28 
This “preclearance” requirement has proved to be the most effective 
technique in American history for protecting the voting rights of 
millions of African-American, Latino, Asian-American, and Native 
American citizens in covered jurisdictions.29 
Section 5 authorizes the Department of Justice to conduct 
administrative preclearance proceedings. Two covered jurisdictions, 
Georgia and Arizona, adopted stringent new voter ID requirements 
and sought administrative preclearance. Both times, the career staff of 
the Civil Rights Division raised concerns about the new identification 
requirements because of the unacceptable risk that they would 
disenfranchise minority voters who lacked the requisite documents. 
Both times, political appointees within the Department overrode 
those concerns and precleared the laws, letting them go into effect.30 
 
 26. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623–24 (Stevens, J.) 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000 & Supp. V. 2005). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting in 
the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH & LEE L. REV. 227, 238–39 
(2001) (describing the transformative effects of the Act); Chandler Davidson & Bernard 
Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE 
SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VRA, 1965–90, at 378, 386 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard 
Grofman eds. 1994) (the VRA is “perhaps the single most successful civil rights bill ever 
passed”). 
 30. See Paul Keil, Former DOJ Official: I Left Due to “Institutional Sabotage,”  
TPM MUCKRAKER, Apr. 30, 2007, http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/ 
003120.php (last visited May 20, 2009) (discussing the Georgia preclearance process);  
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It may well be impossible to determine how many citizens have 
been, or will be, prevented or deterred from voting by these 
identification-requirement laws, but we already have seen striking 
illustrations of their effect. In Indiana, where there had not been a 
single verified episode of impersonation at the polls in the state’s 
history, we have the Retired Nuns, which is not the name of a rock 
band: it is a group of retired nuns in their eighties and nineties who 
went to a polling place located on the ground floor of their convent 
where a pollworker, who was a fellow sister in their order, turned 
them away because they lacked currently valid photo IDs.31 To 
paraphrase Corinthians, maybe the spirit of the Indiana law had 
something to do with electoral integrity, but the letter killeth.32 
In the end, cynical partisans have whipped up an illusory fear of 
fraud and used it as a device to deflect attention away from the real 
problem with American elections: it is not that too many imposters 
vote but that too few citizens participate. Justice Brandeis, in his 
foundational concurrence in Whitney v. California, made a telling 
argument: 
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free 
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is 
the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational 
fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be 
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech 
is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the 
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable 
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.33 
The same argument should apply to suppression of voting rights. 
Fear of fraud alone should not justify preventing thousands of 
Americans from casting votes. We fear impersonators and 
disenfranchise the elderly, the disabled, and the less affluent among 
us. Laws that are designed to deal with a non-existent problem 
operate to disenfranchise real voters. 
 
Tanya Lee, Ex-Justice Official: Native American Vote May Be Issue in U.S. Attorney Firings, 
TARGETED NEWS SERVICE, July 11, 2007 (discussing Arizona preclearance proceeding). 
 31. Cynthia Tucker, Editorial, Even God Couldn’t Vote in Indiana Without Proper ID, 
BALTIMORE SUN, May 12, 2008, at 9A. 
 32. Cf. 2 Corinthians 3:6 (“[N]ot of the letter but of the Spirit. For the letter kills, but the 
Spirit gives life.”). 
 33. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927). 
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C. Redistricting and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
A second example of the Bush Administration’s distortion of 
voting rights involves what I have called Texas’s “DeLayed 
Redistricting,” in honor of then-House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, 
who engineered the state’s mid-decade re-redistricting in order to 
gerrymander a half-dozen incumbent Democrats out of their seats.34 
Part of this “DeLayed Redistricting” involved Congressional 
District 23, which was centered on Laredo, a heavily Latino city in the 
southwestern part of the state. The district was represented by a 
Republican, but his days were clearly numbered: he garnered little 
support from Latino voters, whose share of the electorate was 
expanding rapidly. To shore up the Republican’s prospects, the new 
plan split the Latino community between two districts, reducing the 
number of Latinos in District 23. That plan was ultimately struck 
down by the Supreme Court as a violation of section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, which forbids states from using electoral practices that 
dilute minority voting strength.35 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court held that the redrawn 
lines undercut the “representational rights” of Latino voters who had, 
after a history of political powerlessness, recently “found an 
efficacious political identity”36 that left them “poised to elect their 
candidate of choice.”37 The State, Justice Kennedy explained, “took 
away the Latinos’ opportunity [to elect a candidate in District 23] 
because Latinos were about to exercise it,” an action that “bears the 
mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal 
protection violation.”38 
The “DeLayed Redistricting,” then, was precisely the kind of 
voting change that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was intended to 
prevent. So where was the Department of Justice? On the sidelines. In 
a detailed, 73-page memorandum, the Department’s career staff 
recommended that the Attorney General deny preclearance of 
Texas’s plan because it would lead to an impermissible retrogression 
 
 34. See Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy,  
68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 755 (2007) (discussing the Texas redistricting process). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000 & Supp. V. 2005). 
 36. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 435 (2006). 
 37. Id. at 438. 
 38. Id. at 440. 
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in minority voting strength.39 As in the voter ID cases, however, 
political appointees overrode the career lawyers’ analysis and let the 
plan go into effect. Rather than protecting the ability of minority 
voters to pick their Member of Congress, the Department gave the 
green light to a Member of Congress to pick his colleagues’ 
constituents. 
II.  CONCEPTUAL LESSONS LEARNED: THE NEED FOR AN 
AFFIRMATIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
The problems of the past eight years highlight not just a 
breakdown of federal commitment to protecting voting rights but also 
a deeper conceptual problem: the current protections of the right to 
vote operate as piecemeal prohibitions on specified forms of 
disenfranchisement or dilution rather than as an affirmative 
recognition of a fundamental right to effective participation. Towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court 
declared itself “unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of 
the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon any 
one.”40 The Bush v. Gore Court carried that thought forward into the 
twenty-first century with its offhand comment that “[t]he individual 
citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the 
President of the United States unless and until the state legislature 
chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to 
appoint members of the Electoral College.”41 Thus, while the Fifteenth 
Amendment forbids denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race, and the Nineteenth on account of sex, and the Twenty-Fourth 
on account of failure to pay a poll tax, no amendment—nor, indeed, 
any statute—requires the government to take significant affirmative 
steps to make sure that all citizens are registered or that voting is 
convenient. 
This negative conception of a constitutional right can work fairly 
well if the right is a right to be left alone. The right to privacy, for 
example, can be vindicated in large part simply by telling the 
 
 39. See Memorandum from the U.S. Dept. of Justice to John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney 
General, 71–72 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/ 
documents/texasDOJmemo.pdf (recommending that the Attorney General object to the Texas 
redistricting plan because it resulted in a retrogression). 
 40. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875). 
 41. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam). 
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government to stay out of our bedrooms, or to stay away from our 
emails, or to stay off our property. But a negative conception of a right 
does not work nearly as well when the ability to exercise the right 
depends on government action. A citizen who is handed an official 
ballot in a language she does not understand is effectively denied the 
right to vote. A citizen who lives in a county that uses antiquated 
election machines and who therefore cannot vote during her lunch 
hour due to long lines may also be prevented from voting. If the 
government fails to facilitate voting, we are not going to have a full 
right to vote. 
So what would it mean to develop an affirmative right to vote? It 
would mean saying that the states should treat the right to vote the 
way they treat other aspects of citizenship that they take seriously. 
Consider, for example, jury service: the state affirmatively seeks out 
citizens to serve and sends them summonses with prepaid mailers. 
When it comes to voting, by contrast, states generally wait for aspiring 
voters to come to them. And when states communicate with citizens—
say, by providing absentee ballots—they place the cost of responding 
on the citizens. 
Other nations act quite differently. In Canada, for example, the 
national government for many years conducted a “door-to-door 
enumeration” before every federal election to make sure that all 
eligible citizens were able to participate. It moved away from this 
system only when it had developed a national database with 
systematic updating.42 In many other countries, people vote on 
holidays or the government provides to them, free of charge, the 
identity documents required to cast a ballot. 
One forgotten lesson, not from the Bush Administration but from 
the Johnson Administration, is that this kind of affirmative executive 
branch action can work. An important provision of the original Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 authorized the Attorney General to certify the 
need for federal examiners to register voters in covered jurisdictions.43 
In the two years after the Act was passed, the Administration used 
civil service employees to register more African-Americans in the 
 
 42. See Description of the National Register of Electors (February 2005), 
http://www.elections.ca/content.asp?section=ins&document=national&dir=nre&lang=e&textonl
y=false (last visted May 20, 2009) (describing a brief history of Canada’s voter registration 
process). 
 43. Voting Rights Act of 1965, §§ 6–7 (repealed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d, 1973e). 
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South than had been registered in the century since the Fifteenth 
Amendment had been ratified.44 So we know great things can be 
accomplished if we have an administration that has the will to do 
them. 
III.  INSTITUTIONAL LESSONS LEARNED: HOW THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION POLITICIZED THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 
The institutional lesson we learned from the Bush years is that the 
Civil Rights Division, and the Voting Section in particular, need to be 
thoroughly restored. The recent reports by the Department of 
Justice’s Inspector General, Glenn Fine, detail an appalling picture. 
The titles tell the story: 
 An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring and 
Other Improper Personnel Actions in the Civil Rights Division45 
 An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys in 
200646 
 An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by 
Monica Goodling and Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney 
General47 
 An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring in the 
Department of Justice Honors Program and Summer Law Intern 
Program.48 
 
 44. CHANDLER DAVIDSON, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN 
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 21 (Bernard Grofman & 
Chandler Davidson eds., 1992). 
 45. U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General & Office of Professional 
Responsibility, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring and Other Improper 
Personnel Actions in the Civil Rights Division, July 2, 2008, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf. 
 46. U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General & Office of Professional 
Responsibility, An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006, Sept. 2008, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf. 
 47. U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General & Office of Professional 
Responsibility, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring by Monica Goodling and 
Other Staff in the Office of the Attorney General, July 28, 2008, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf. 
 48. U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General & Office of Professional 
Responsibility, An Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring in the Department of Justice 
Honors Program and Summer Law Intern Program, June 24, 2008, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0806/final.pdf. 
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The reports themselves make for gripping, if sickening, reading. 
They show a Department, and a Division, that squandered literally 
hundreds of years of experience and expertise that were acquired and 
deployed during previous Administrations, Democratic and 
Republican alike. The reports also show blatant manipulations of the 
law enforcement process in order to influence election outcomes.49 
Approximately sixty percent of the career staff of the Voting 
Section of the Department of Justice left during the Bush 
Administration.50 This was a group of people who had brought an 
amazing wealth of experience, knowledge, and commitment to the 
enforcement of the law and, in particular, to the Department of 
Justice’s special responsibilities under section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act. 
The Civil Rights Division, for five of the eight years of the Bush 
Administration, brought no Voting Rights Act cases of its own except 
for one case protecting white voters in a majority-black town in 
Mississippi.51 It precleared changes that never would have been 
precleared in the past. It hired people who never would have been 
hired in the past because political appointees took over the hiring 
process for career positions and used straightforwardly political and 
ideological criteria in selecting applicants. In the end, the 
Administration turned even on its own appointees, firing a number of 
presidentially-appointed United States Attorneys for their refusals to 
manipulate the prosecutorial process to initiate election-related 
prosecutions for partisan gain.52 A central lesson we have learned 
from this Administration is that a politicized Department of Justice 
cannot perform its tasks fully and fairly. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Bush Administration compiled a troubling record indeed 
when it comes to voting rights. But as my favorite baseball 
 
 49. An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys, supra note 46. 
 50. Oral Testimony of Joseph D. Rich at the Oversight Hearing of the Civil Rights 
Division Held Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties at 3 (Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://www.votelaw.com/blog/blogdocs/ 
rich%20oral%20testimony%203%2022%20final.pdf. 
 51. United States v. Noxubee County Dem. Exec. Comm., 494 F. Supp. 2d 440  
(S.D. Miss. 2007). 
 52. An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys, supra note 46. 
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philosopher, Satchel Paige, once remarked, “Let whomsoever wishes 
sit around recollecting. I’m looking up the line.”53 So going forward, 
what should we do? First, we need legislation that recognizes an 
official obligation to make sure all citizens who are eligible to vote are 
placed on the voting rolls and that elections run smoothly and 
accurately. We could learn something from examining how other 
democracies, advanced and emerging, manage to achieve registration 
and turnout rates that dwarf our own.54 
Second, in the arena of voting rights, it is critical to make sure the 
rules are clear and clearly established before the election begins. 
Once the election is underway, litigation over the rules is likely to 
cause confusion and the partisan consequences of various decisions 
become so clear that they can distort the results. If someone had 
asked the United States Supreme Court in the spring of 2000 how it 
would decide a hypothetical case like Bush v. Gore, I suspect he 
would have gotten a very different answer than the one given in 
December 2000, when it was clear which way the chads would fall. 
Finally, we must recognize that we can have a political system that 
works only when the Department of Justice attorneys who enforce 
voting rights are not themselves partisan activists. Never before the 
Bush Administration did we have so politicized a process of hiring 
career employees, supervising career employees, and rewarding and 
punishing career employees as we have had over the last eight years. 
And we should make sure this never happens again. 
 
 
 53. Editorial, Satchel, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1982, at A30. 
 54. See, e.g., Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Turnout in the World—
Country by Country Performance, http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout_pop2.cfm (last 
visted May 20, 2009) (listing the percentage turnout of voters for each country; the United 
States is ranked 139 out of 172 countries). 
